

6 APRIL 1974

REMARKS TO VINCE DAVIS SEMINAR AT
PATTERSON SCHOOL, by STANSFIELD TURNER

NAVY review(s) completed.

REMARKS TO VINCE DAVIS SEMINAR AT PATTERSON SCHOOL

Saturday, 6 April 1974

It really is a delight to be here, a delight to have this opportunity to exchange ideas with a distinguished group of educators. My College is what we believe to be mid-career education, rather than what I imagine most of you are dealing with, undergraduate and graduate education. Our students are about 28 to 48 in age. They are people who have achieved a great deal already in their professional experience instead of looking forward to starting in it, as most of your students are. Still, I think there is a great deal that we have in common as educators and I look forward in our question period to sharing some of those things and discussing them.

I think that we in the military have been falling on our swords too much in recent years in the effort to explain and articulate in a rational manner why we do need military forces in the era of peace and detente that we have with us today. I think it's quite understandable that the public and the Congress are questioning the Defense budget these days. After all the 1975 proposed budget is the largest peacetime military budget in history despite at least 4 substantial pressures in the opposite direction.

First the perceived decline in the utility of military force today. I think we only have to look back to our experience in Vietnam, where the greatest and strongest military

power in the world was unable to force its political will on a third or fourth rate military power. We only have to consider that the nuclear balance backdrop that influences all of our political and military decisions today is a very inhibiting factor on the use of military force by either of the so called superpowers.

Second, I think we also perceive that there is a decline in the acceptability of the use of military force, at least in the major western democracies where public opinion has an influence on public policy. I attribute this to the explosion in the communications capabilities of the world. There is, as a result of this, a greater moral revulsion towards the use of force today than there has been in the past. There is also a greater public awareness of the issues that could lead to the use of military force. In short, the public is taking an interest in the game earlier today than it did in years past.

Third you are more aware than I that there are great clamoring demands for alternative uses of the funds that are put into Defense today.

Fourth, we have this new word, "detente," and with it the feeling that detente is a reason for lessening the size and investment in our military forces. Let me come back to that a little bit later. But what I'm suggesting is that we in the military, and all others who are interested in

national security affairs, need to be more articulate in answering the question: Why do we need sizeable standing military forces in the peacetime circumstances with which we are faced today, particularly, when a large standing military is contrary to American tradition?

Let me try to run through for you briefly what I see as some of the most cogent reasons for having this military establishment today. To begin with, I think there is rather little debate on whether we do need forces for strategic nuclear deterrence. We really cannot run the risk of not deterring the ultimate holocaust that could spell destruction and doom for the entire world. Now, clearly, the amount of strategic deterrent force we need and what kind we want is open to great debate, but I think there would be general agreement that we do need to fulfill that function.

I would think there would be equal agreement in our country that we need to be able to defend the United States. There is, though, great room for debate on how and where we must accomplish that; on our shorelines, in some overseas location where aggression takes place, or even in some area where there are economic influences on our national position. So I think there is room for legitimate debate on what our overseas commitments ought to be. If you take a consensus, I think you would also find that most people would agree that we would probably want to help to defend Western Europe. Some others, I think, would extend that further and say we ought to help to

defend Western Europe and Israel. There are still others who would say that this policy is too restrictive, that we must be able to do more but they would probably be less precise about where else they would be willing to commit American military force.

The real issue I think we're grappling with in trying to develop a rationale for military forces of the conventional type today is how far from our shore do U.S. vital interests truly extend. I would submit that at one extreme a fortress America concept of defending our shoreline is totally outdated, I also would submit to you a simple axiom for approximating the sizing of U.S. military forces.

I would suggest that the United States must have the plainly evident capability to defend our vital national interests, with military force if necessary, wherever those interests lie. Now this does not mean necessarily that resort to military force would be our first response in any kind of a crisis situation. In fact I would suggest that the emphasis in this axiom be on the words plainly evident. Now the emphasis is on the evident part because it's perceptions that we want to create, perceptions that will make our military capability deter rather than have to be employed.

The essence of deterrence is perception - three basic perceptions of principal concern to us:

First, there are perceptions of the Soviets of our military capability. I think it is very important that we not

encourage the Soviets to perceive such an imbalance in military capabilities that they might be tempted either to apply leverage on us, or actually to employ military force against us.

Another perception with which I think we must be most concerned is our own estimate of our position in the world balance of power. I think it's most important because we hear many people saying today that the United States military cannot aspire to be first in everything. But I think it is very important that the public of the United States not come to perceive that we are at such a military disadvantage it would be better to be "Red than dead." I feel it is very important we not come to a perception that we have lost the pride and leadership on which the free world has been dependent for over a quarter of a century. No matter what we say today about our declining capabilities, about our willingness to assume the burdens of being policemen to the world, we the United States are still the major power that supports the dignity, the freedom and rights of individual men.

Thirdly, I think we must be concerned about the perceptions other nations hold towards us and the Soviet Union, both individually and as we balance against each other. The perceptions of these other nations will obviously influence their diplomatic, economic, and military actions. So it is important to us that we take the perceptions of these other nations into account, because again, despite the pressures

in this country to retrench, to reduce commitments and not be the world's policemen, I would suggest that our national interests are, in fact, extending farther overseas rather than receding today. Now I know that there are a lot of people who would not agree with me; let me recite five brief examples as to why I believe that's the case:

First, let's look at the burgeoning economies of Western Europe and Japan. We have a Gross National Product of twelve hundred billion dollars. The European Economic Community nations total is something over six hundred billion and Japan about three hundred. If we were to add either of those to the approximate five hundred billion of the Soviet Union I think you can see the great economic power if either one of those slipped into the Soviet orbit.

Secondly, U.S. reliance on the import of raw materials from overseas is clearly increasing. We're not talking just of the oil energy situation; we're talking of the ninety percent of our chromium, rubber, manganese, cobalt, and graphite that all come in from overseas. We're talking about the fact that sixty nine of the seventy-one critical raw materials that this country consumes are imported, in some measure, from overseas. This contrasts with only two of those seventy-one which are imported by the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the more we import the more we clearly must export to keep our payments balanced. So trade all around the world is going to be increasingly important to this country in the years ahead.

Next, it seems clear that the entire world is coming to a greater dependence on exploiting the vast resources of the oceans. This will involve us more in interests overseas than in the past, because exploiting the resources of the oceans does not simply mean going out to the limit of our territorial jurisdiction. I live on the edge of the Atlantic Ocean and only twelve miles away there is frequently a very extensive Soviet fishing fleet. On top of that, a very few nations of the world today control some of the most vital waterways through which this commerce on which we are all going to depend must pass. Malaysia and Indonesia for the Straits of Malacca; Egypt, if Bernie's (Abrahamsson) predictions are true, the Suez Canal which will be open before long; Spain with the Straits of Gibraltar, etc. So again, we are going to be involved. We are going to be concerned with these strategic overseas areas.

Fourth, I see at least a continuing, if not an increasing, resort to the use of military force as an instrument of national policy by many of the countries that are just below the major power level in the world. The Arabs and Israelis, the Pakistanis, the Indians, the Iraqis the North and South Vietnamese. The potential in the near future for insurgency such as is going on in Cambodia today, inspired by the success of the North Vietnamese is very high. In short, if these other powers do get involved in military conflict there is always that danger of one or both of the major powers being inadvertently and unwillingly dragged in and we must be concerned.

Lastly, I would like to mention there is a great potential for international strife in the future as a result of the growing disparities between the economies of the lesser developed countries and the industrial nations. We just cannot turn our backs on the severe problems within the lesser developed countries in the years ahead.

Let me hastily emphasize that I do not necessarily see this growing interest and concern with overseas areas as creasing an increasing probability of our intervention with military force. I'm simply suggesting we must consider the perceptions of these other countries. We must consider how they view the power balance between us and the Soviet Union, particularly because of the impact it will have on their political and economic decisions.

This brings me back to detente. There are some who say that detente indicates the Soviets will never take advantage of us. In any event, even if other nations perceive a discrepancy between our capabilities and theirs. Well, that's a very hopeful attitude. It's one we should try to encourage becoming fact, a risky matter on which to base your policy. In the first place, we see no sign of any decreasing emphasis in the size and capability of military forces within the Soviet Union. In fact, I think we can clearly establish that the opposite is the case. Even more important, when we look at detente from the Soviet point of view rather than through rose colored glasses, I think we have to recognize that they view detente not as a cessation of competition with the United

States, but as a continuation of that competition but in non-military areas. That shift of competition may be a good thing, something we should encourage, but at the same time we should not delude ourselves into thinking that the world has become non-competitive.

We must recognize that, if we were to become too weak in a military sense, we might actually destroy the incentive for detente by tempting the Soviets to take advantage of us through military force. We have to be particularly careful here because we are dealing with a closed society. There is no way we can be assured that we can predict when the Soviets might suddenly turn 180° and reject the concept of detente. Mutual reductions in military forces under a concept of detente or limitations on forces are one thing. Unless we have a mutually agreeable position, a unilateral reduction on the United States' part could upset the basic balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union and injure the forces that are helping to encourage and develop detente today. This is the reason, in my view, that the defense budget must stay at its current level. However, I would add that the real purchasing power of the 1975 budget in constant dollars is under the pre-Vietnam level. It is the smallest in real purchasing power since 1951.

Still, there are those who will misunderstand this budget. They will raise the objection that the mere existence of military forces will encourage their use. I cannot deny that there exists some possibility with which we must be seriously

concerned. At the same time all of us recognize from history that a lack of preparedness has, on occasions like World War I, World War II and Korea, encouraged aggression. So we must look today at the alternatives.

We could, of course, disarm more rapidly than the Soviets and possibly risk upsetting detente. On the other hand, and I think more feasible, we might simply exercise firm civilian control so that having force does not necessarily encourage its use unless that is truly a conscious, civilian directed policy. In short, I don't suggest that turning into a eunuch is the best possible way to avoid possible pregnancies.

Let me wrap up by saying that in our thinking in national security affairs today we must learn to separate our willingness to use military force from the necessity for maintaining forces, which does not mean we must employ them. Too often we do not appreciate that letting the balance of force slide against us and becoming impotent relative to the Soviets could, in fact, push us into the commitment of military force that we would like to avoid. I think it's important also that we separate the desire to encourage detente from this same necessity for maintaining military forces. Too often we do not appreciate that maintaining military forces does not necessarily mean we must dampen our progress towards detente. Too often we do not appreciate that, if we let the balance slide against us or become impotent relative to the Soviets, we could in fact kill the very incentive that has brought the Soviets to agree to move towards detente. At the same time, we in uniform and all of

you who are interested in national security affairs must certainly recognize the need for continually rethinking the size and kind of military forces that are applicable to this country, as well as the policies and tactics applicable to them.

Essentially, I think we must ensure that our military forces today are ready, not only to do combat, but to support our national policy in all its aspects. Now this may seem overly simplistic or trite; people like Clausewitz told us this over a century ago. Today there is still a lingering tradition that the American military is designed to fight, to win, to destroy the enemy capabilities to resist. In 1953, when we negotiated a settlement to the Korean War, I think it became obvious that we had to begin looking at our military purpose as being a bargaining instrument to help obtain an acceptable political solution. Yet I believe that one of the great problems during Vietnam, on both the military side of the house and in the public, was that neither of us fully understood this.

To go back to the beginning, the utility and acceptability of the employment of military force is declining today, but I think this only means that we must be increasingly aware that military force has to be an adjunct to national policy, not an end in itself. Yes, there are many alternative uses for the resources that we're dedicating to military forces today, but the defense budget is declining in purchasing power.

Hopefully, it is unlikely that the Congress will make risky and substantial cuts in the defense budget. The answers to the social ills of this country do not really lie in diverting resources from the defense of our nation, as too often people are inclined to believe. And finally, detente must have its impact on our military force structure and it certainly will, through negotiations.

We must continue to recognize that, while the world is becoming multi-polar in a political and economic sense, it is still basically bi-polar in a military sense. As long as it is, our decisions on military policy and posture must be taken against a backdrop of our overall balance versus the Soviet Union.

I'm delighted to see so many of you from the educational field here exploring this topic of national security interests. I believe it is one of the most exciting fields of academic endeavor today. We require a much more sophisticated approach to the use of military force, to the maintainence of military force, and to the conduct of national security affairs in general. We in the military are trying hard to recognize that there is that necessity for greater depth of thinking in these areas. As Vince Davis said, we have tried at the Naval War College to completely revamp the program, to push and encourage our students into deep probing and thinking in these areas. I would like to conclude by saying that we very much need your

help, your stimulation, your probing, and that of your students as well. That's why I'm so pleased that you've taken the time to participate in this series of seminars and I'm so grateful to Vince) for organizing it. Thank you.

QUESTIONS FOLLOWING THE ADDRESS:

1. How do we build a perception in our nation of our need for a military--how do we regenerate conviction that we need a military?
2. What are your views on SALT I and prognosis for SALT II?
3. Why did SecDef make the announcement on retargeting?
4. How can we correct cost overruns?
5. How long do you foresee the world remaining militarily bipolar?
6. What do you consider to be the effect of the Nixon difficulties on the world's perception of our military power and national will?
7. What do you consider to be a security issue (e.g. environment, scarcity of resources, distribution of wealth)?
8. What is national interest and how do you define it?
9. There are those who claim that the existence of a strong military creates the tendency to use it. How do we prevent the military from becoming instigators, not a deterrent?

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power in the world was unable to force its political will on a third or fourth rate military power. We only have to consider that the nuclear balance backdrop that influences all of our political and military decisions today is a very inhibiting factor on the use of military force by either of the so-called superpowers.

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defend Western Europe and Israel. There are still others who would say that this policy is too restrictive, that we must be able to do more but they would probably be less precise about where else they would be willing to commit American military force.

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I think that we in the military have been falling on our swords too much in recent years in the effort to explain and articulate in a rational manner why we do need military forces in the era of peace and detente that we have with us today. I think it's quite understandable that the public and the Congress are questioning the Defense budget these days. After all the 1975 proposed budget is the largest peacetime military budget in history despite at least 4 substantial pressures in the opposite direction.

First the perceived decline in the utility of military force today. I think we only have to look back to our experience in Vietnam, where the greatest and strongest military

power in the world was unable to force its political will on a third or fourth rate military power. We only have to consider that the nuclear balance backdrop that influences all of our political and military decisions today is a very inhibiting factor on the use of military force by either of the so called superpowers.

Second, I think we also perceive that there is a decline in the acceptability of the use of military force, at least in the major western democracies where public opinion has an influence on public policy. I attribute this to the explosion in the communications capabilities of the world. There is, as a result of this, a greater moral revulsion towards the use of force today than there has been in the past. There is also a greater public awareness of the issues that could lead to the use of military force. In short, the public is taking an interest in the game earlier today than it did in years past.

Third you are more aware than I that there are great clamoring demands for alternative uses of the funds that are put into Defense today.

Fourth, we have this new word, "detente," and with it the feeling that detente is a reason for lessening the size and investment in our military forces. Let me come back to that a little bit later. But what I'm suggesting is that we in the military, and all others who are interested in

national security affairs, need to be more articulate in answering the question: Why do we need sizeable standing military forces in the peacetime circumstances with which we are faced today, particularly, when a large standing military is contrary to American tradition?

Let me try to run through for you briefly what I see as some of the most cogent reasons for having this military establishment today. To begin with, I think there is rather little debate on whether we do need forces for strategic nuclear deterrence. We really cannot run the risk of not deterring the ultimate holocaust that could spell destruction and doom for the entire world. Now, clearly, the amount of strategic deterrent force we need and what kind we want is open to great debate, but I think there would be general agreement that we do need to fulfill that function.

I would think there would be equal agreement in our country that we need to be able to defend the United States. There is, though, great room for debate on how and where we must accomplish that; on our shorelines, in some overseas location where aggression takes place, or even in some areas where there are economic influences on our national position. So I think there is room for legitimate debate on what our overseas commitments ought to be. If you take a consensus, I think you would also find that most people would agree that we would probably want to help to defend Western Europe. Some others, I think, would extend that further and say we ought to help to

defend Western Europe and Israel. There are still others who would say that this policy is too restrictive, that we must be able to do more but they would probably be less precise about where else they would be willing to commit American military force.

The real issue I think we're grappling with in trying to develop a rationale for military forces of the conventional type today is how far from our shore do U.S. vital interests truly extend. I would submit that at one extreme a fortress America concept of defending our shoreline is totally outdated, I also would submit to you a simple axiom for approximating the sizing of U.S. military forces.

I would suggest that the United States must have the plainly evident capability to defend our vital national interests, with military force if necessary, wherever those interests lie. Now this does not mean necessarily that resort to military force would be our first response in any kind of a crisis situation. In fact I would suggest that the emphasis in this axiom be on the words plainly evident. Now the emphasis is on the evident part because it's perceptions that we want to create, perceptions that will make our military capability deter rather than have to be employed.

The essence of deterrence is perception - three basic perceptions of principal concern to us:

First, there are perceptions of the Soviets of our military capability. I think it is very important that we not

encourage the Soviets to perceive such an imbalance in military capabilities that they might be tempted either to apply leverage on us, or actually to employ military force against us.

Another perception with which I think we must be most concerned is our own estimate of our position in the world balance of power. I think it's most important because we hear many people saying today that the United States military cannot aspire to be first in everything. But I think it is very important that the public of the United States not come to perceive that we are at such a military disadvantage it would be better to be "Red than dead." I feel it is very important we not come to a perception that we have lost the pride and leadership on which the free world has been dependent for over a quarter of a century. No matter what we say today about our declining capabilities, about our willingness to assume the burdens of being policemen to the world, we the United States are still the major power that supports the dignity, the freedom and rights of individual men.

Thirdly, I think we must be concerned about the perceptions other nations hold towards us and the Soviet Union, both individually and as we balance against each other. The perceptions of these other nations will obviously influence their diplomatic, economic, and military actions. So it is important to us that we take the perceptions of these other nations into account, because again, despite the pressures

in this country to retrench, to reduce commitments and not be the world's policemen, I would suggest that our national interests are, in fact, extending farther overseas rather than receding today. Now I know that there are a lot of people who would not agree with me; let me recite five brief examples as to why I believe that's the case:

First, let's look at the burgeoning economies of Western Europe and Japan. We have a Gross National Product of twelve hundred billion dollars. The European Economic Community nations total is something over six hundred billion and Japan about three hundred. If we were to add either of those to the approximate five hundred billion of the Soviet Union I think you can see the great economic power if either one of those slipped into the Soviet orbit.

Secondly, U.S. reliance on the import of raw materials from overseas is clearly increasing. We're not talking just of the oil energy situation; we're talking of the ninety percent of our chromium, rubber, manganese, cobalt, and graphite that all come in from overseas. We're talking about the fact that sixty nine of the seventy-one critical raw materials that this country consumes are imported, in some measure, from overseas. This contrasts with only two of those seventy-one which are imported by the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the more we import the more we clearly must export to keep our payments balanced. So trade all around the world is going to be increasingly important to this country in the years ahead.

Next, it seems clear that the entire world is coming to a greater dependence on exploiting the vast resources of the oceans. This will involve us more in interests overseas than in the past--because exploiting the resources of the oceans does not simply mean going out to the limit of our territorial jurisdiction. I live on the edge of the Atlantic Ocean and only twelve miles away there is frequently a very extensive Soviet fishing fleet. On top of that, a very few nations of the world today control some of the most vital waterways through which this commerce on which we are all going to depend must pass. Malaysia and Indonesia for the Straits of Malacca; Egypt, if Bernie's ~~s~~ (Abrahamsson) predictions are true, the Suez Canal which will be open before long; Spain with the Straits of Gibraltar, etc. So again, we are going to be involved. We are going to be concerned with these strategic overseas areas.

Fourth, I see at least a continuing, if not an increasing, resort to the use of military force as an instrument of national policy by many of the countries that are just below the major power level in the world. The Arabs and Israelis, the Pakistanis, the Indians, the Iraqis the North and South Vietnamese. The potential in the near future for insurgency such as is going on in Cambodia today, inspired by the success of the North Vietnamese is very high. In short, if these other powers do get involved in military conflict there is always that danger of one or both of the major powers being inadvertently ~~and unwillingly~~ dragged in and we must be concerned.

Lastly, I would like to mention there is a great potential for international strife in the future as a result of the growing disparities between the economies of the lesser developed countries and the industrial nations. We just cannot turn our backs on the severe problems within the lesser developed countries in the years ahead.

Let me hastily emphasize that I do not necessarily see this growing interest and concern with overseas areas as creasing an increasing probability of our intervention with military force. I'm simply suggesting we must consider the perceptions of these other countries. We must consider how they view the power balance between us and the Soviet Union, particularly because of the impact it will have on their political and economic decisions.

This brings me back to detente. There are some who say that detente indicates the Soviets will never take advantage of us: in any event, even if other nations perceive a discrepancy between our capabilities and theirs. Well, that's a very hopeful attitude. It's one we should try to encourage becoming fact, a risky matter on which to base your policy. In the first place, we see no sign of any decreasing emphasis in the size and capability of military forces within the Soviet Union. In fact, I think we can clearly establish that the opposite is the case. Even more important, when we look at detente from the Soviet point of view rather than through rose colored glasses, I think we have to recognize that they view detente not as a cessation of competition with the United

States, but as a continuation of that competition but in non-military areas. That shift of competition may be a good thing, something we should encourage, but at the same time we should not delude ourselves into thinking that the world has become non-competitive.

We must recognize that, if we were to become too weak in a military sense, we might actually destroy the incentive for detente by tempting the Soviets to take advantage of us through military force. We have to be particularly careful here because we are dealing with a closed society. There is no way we can be assured that we can predict when the Soviets might suddenly turn 180° and reject the concept of detente. Mutual reductions in military forces under a concept of detente or limitations on forces are one thing. Unless we have a mutually agreeable position, a unilateral re-duction on the United States' part could upset the basic balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union and injure the forces that are helping to encourage and develop detente today. This is the reason, in my view, that the defense budget must stay at its current level. However, I would add that the real purchasing power of the 1975 budget in constant dollars is under the pre-Vietnam level. It is the smallest in real purchasing power since 1951.

Still, there are those who will misunderstand this budget. They will raise the objection that the mere existence of military forces will encourage their use. I cannot deny that there exists some possibility with which we must be seriously

concerned. At the same time all of us recognize from history that a lack of preparedness has, on occasions like World War I, World War II and Korea, encouraged aggression. So we must look today at the alternatives.

We could, of course, disarm more rapidly than the Soviets and possibly risk upsetting detente. On the other hand, and I think more feasible, we might simply exercise firm civilian control so that having force does not necessarily encourage its use unless that is truly a conscious, civilian directed policy. In short, I don't suggest that turning into a eunuch is the best possible way to avoid possible pregnancies.

Let me wrap up by saying that in our thinking in national security affairs today we must learn to separate our willingness to use military force from the necessity for maintaining forces, which does not mean we must employ them. Too often we do not appreciate that letting the balance of force slide against us and becoming impotent relative to the Soviets could, in fact, push us into the commitment of military force that we would like to avoid. I think it's important also that we separate the desire to encourage detente from this same necessity for maintaining military forces. Too often we do not appreciate that maintaining military forces does not necessarily mean we must dampen our progress towards detente. Too often we do not appreciate that, if we let the balance slide against us or become impotent relative to the Soviets, we could in fact kill the very incentive that has brought the Soviets to agree to move towards detente. At the same time, we in uniform and all of

you who are interested in national security affairs must certainly recognize the need for continually rethinking the size and kind of military forces that are applicable to this country, as well as the policies and tactics applicable to them.

Essentially, I think we must ensure that our military forces today are ready, not only to do combat, but to support our national policy in all its aspects. Now this may seem overly simplistic or trite; people like Clausewitz told us this over a century ago. Today there is still a lingering tradition that the American military is designed to fight, to win, to destroy the enemy capabilities to resist. In 1953, when we negotiated a settlement to the Korean War, I think it became obvious that we had to begin looking at our military purpose as being a bargaining instrument to help obtain an acceptable political solution. Yet I believe that one of the great problems during Vietnam, on both the military side of the house and in the public, was that neither of us fully understood this.

To go back to the beginning, the utility and acceptability of the employment of military force is declining today, but I think this only means that we must be increasingly aware that military force has to be an adjunct to national policy, not an end in itself. Yes, there are many alternative uses for the resources that we're dedicating to military forces today, but the defense budget is declining in purchasing power.

Hopefully, it is unlikely that the Congress will make risky and substantial cuts in the defense budget. The answers to the social ills of this country do not really lie in diverting resources from the defense of our nation, as too often people are inclined to believe. And finally, detente must have its impact on our military force structure and it certainly will, through negotiations.

We must continue to recognize that, while the world is becoming multi-polar in a political and economic sense, it is still basically bi-polar in a military sense. As long as it is, our decisions on military policy and posture must be taken against a backdrop of our overall balance versus the Soviet Union.

I'm delighted to see so many of you from the educational field here exploring this topic of national security interests. I believe it is one of the most exciting fields of academic endeavor today. We require a much more sophisticated approach to the use of military force, to the maintainence of military force, and to the conduct of national security affairs in general. We in the military are trying hard to recognize that there is that necessity for greater depth of thinking in these areas. As Vince Davis said, we have tried at the Naval War College to completely revamp the program, to push and encourage our students into deep probing and thinking in these areas. I would like to conclude by saying that we very much need your

help, your stimulation, your probing, and that of your students as well. That's why I'm so pleased that you've taken the time to participate in this series of seminars and I'm so grateful to Vince for organizing it. Thank you.

QUESTIONS FOLLOWING THE ADDRESS:

1. How do we build a perception in our nation of our need for a military--how do we regenerate conviction that we need a military?
2. What are your views on SALT I and prognosis for SALT II?
3. Why did SecDef make the announcement on retargeting?
4. How can we correct cost overruns?
5. How long do you foresee the world remaining militarily bipolar?
6. What do you consider to be the effect of the Nixon difficulties on the world's perception of our military power and national will?
7. What do you consider to be a security issue (e.g. environment, scarcity of resources, distribution of wealth)?
8. What is national interest and how do you define it?
9. There are those who claim that the existence of a strong military creates the tendency to use it. How do we prevent the military from becoming instigators, not a deterrent?